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Of Emergency, Precedents For Anti-u.s. Actions
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Published: Friday, April 22, 1988
[The following is adapted from the lead article (dated April 13) of the forthcoming March/April issue
of HONDURAS UPDATE, by the editors, titled "State of Emergency." The Update is published
by the Honduras Information Center, One Summer Street, Somerville, MA 02143 (617) 625-7220.
Subscriptions for individuals are $14, single copies of the March/April issue are $2.50.] On April 5,
notorious drug trafficker Juan Ramon Matta Ballesteros was kidnapped by Honduran police and
delivered to the United States...As a matter of principle, most Hondurans did not feel that the nature
of Matta's crimes justified the authorities' premeditated breach of the constitution in capturing him.
Top officials including President Jose Azcona had repeatedly vowed to respect the constitutional
prohibition of extradition. The government appeared to be standing up to US pressure; its eventual
capitulation was a stinging insult to Hondurans' already ravaged national pride. In the months
prior to his capture, in media interviews, Matta had portrayed himself as a victim of US government
persecution. Further, with his ill-gotten fortunes, Matta was able to provide for a few what the
policies of the US-Honduran alliance could not provide for all: jobs (4-5,000), clinics, community
development projects such as water systems, etc. So some were sincerely sorry to see him go. A
Kidnapping: In a broadcast over Radio America April 6, the day after Matta's kidnapping and the
day before the embassy demonstration, anonymous Honduran government officials told Radio
America reporter David Romero Herles about a letter from Elliott Abrams to President Azcona. The
ex-ambassador to Honduras and current member of the National Security Council, John Dimitri
Negroponte, hand-delivered the letter during an official visit [on March 7-9], the sources said.
Unambiguously, the letter was blackmail. Give us Matta, Abrams reportedly threatened, or we
blow the whistle on five top Honduran military officers for drug running (and hold back some AID
funds). five colonels as revealed to him by a different source: Col. Roberto Nunez Montes, Chief
of Intelligence; Col. Wilfredo Sanchez, Minister of Defense; Col. Roberto Martinez Avila, Chief
of the Joint Chiefs; Col. Carlos Reyes Barahona, Honduran representative to the Inter-American
Defense Board in Washington, and Col. Leonel Gutierrez Minera, Commander of the Naval Force.
The Los Angeles Times and the Washington Times both mentioned the Radio America report with
a State Department disclaimer that it was fabrication (April 8). The rest of the US press and media
are ignoring it. According to Honduran politicians, the list of colonels is genuine and those officers
will be shuffled out of the high command in the next weeks or months. Rather than disputing the
facts, the military has demanded that the reporter reveal his source. Romero Herles refuses. There
is obviously a conflict going on within the Armed Forces. Based on scant evidence that has emerged
so far, it is impossible to say whether the conflict is mainly around drug interests, contra support
and the US alliance, a generation gap, or trouble between armed forces chief Regalado Hernandez
and the 56-officer ruling Supreme Council. Clearly, the US blackmail gave the military a motive,
along with other Hondurans, for anger at the US. For one reason or another, the military waited
over two hours to respond to the US request for riot police to prevent the sacking of the consulate.
April 7: It was the Honduran right that called for a march on the embassy. The United University
Democratic Front (FUUD), a powerful reactionary student organization at the National University,
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put out the first call. This group has flourished during the tenure of the current university rector,
Osvaldo Ramos Soto. Ramos is a candidate for the National Party presidential nomination, has
strong ties to the military, and is a Honduran promoter for CAUSA International (a political network
of the Unification Church). He supported the march. Progressive students from the university
and the Teachers College joined in, as did Matta associates and beneficiaries of his largess. As
the march passed through the city, passers-by also joined. The several thousand demonstrators
reached the embassy around 7:30 p.m. Rock throwing and car and building burning began around
8:20. No conclusive evidence has emerged yet to show who started the violence, or whether it was
set off by gunshots. Numerous demonstrators including one of the wounded stated that shots did
come from inside embassy buildings. Another of the wounded said he was shot from within the
crowd, and reporters from EFE (Spanish news service) also saw guns in the crowd. It is believed that
four demonstrators were shot and an 11-year-old girl died in a fire...Around 10:30 p.m., Honduran
security forces arrived and quickly dispersed the crowd... After leaving the embassy, some of the
demonstrators went to President Azcona's residence but found it already heavily defended. Others
went downtown to the Bank of the Armed Forces (BANFFAA) and broke a plateglass window
but were prevented from entering. The total number of arrests that night is not yet known. The
next day, Friday, some schools closed because so many students had left to protest the previous
day's killings. By late morning, at least 1,000 people were marching through Tegucigalpa, led by
students from the Teachers College. Around 11:30 a.m., riot police used tear gas to break up the
march and arrested five students. In the northern city of San Pedro Sula, hundreds also protested
the killings and perhaps as many as 100 were arrested... State of Emergency: On Friday, April 8,...the
Azcona government decreed a state of emergency, suspending the constitutional rights of liberty,
assembly, and travel, and suspending the constraints on powers of arrest and detention. As of 5:00
a.m. the government had already taken control of all radio and television stations and was only
broadcasting popular music interrupted by repetitions of government communiques: first a call
for sanity and calm, then the state of emergency announcement... Only one newspaper was told
to suspend operations. To no one's surprise, it was Tiempo, the paper most openly critical of the
government and the only one to cover the Radio America story mentioned above. After resistance
and negotiations, the authorities relented and permitted Tiempo to go to press. On Friday, troops
filled the downtown sections of Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula. Troops also entered and occupied
the Teachers College and adjacent Escuela de Aplicacion. Despite the intense level of control,
sporadic acts of violence took place in both cities. In San Pedro Sula on Friday night, three homes
owned by US citizens were set on fire. A US citizen was reportedly beaten in Tegucigalpa, cars were
overturned and windows broken. The US embassy evacuated US citizens from the luxury Hotel
Maya. At 10:30 a.m. on April 9, 10 shots were fired at the office of the Committee for the Defense
of Human Rights (CODEH). At 6:30 p.m., persons in civilian clothes shot 8 bullets into the medical
office of Dr. Ramon Custodio, the president of CODEH. No one was injured in either incident.
The CODEH offices are in the part of town under heaviest military control. Next, two leaders of
the progressive FUTH labor federation were arrested on Saturday... While it is clear that while
the embassy action was not CODEH and the FUTH, nor was it at all consistent with their record
of non-violent protest), those groups suffered intimidation, attacks and arrests under the state of
emergency. Whether any of the right-wing leaders of the action were arrested, and if so, whether
they or their organizations will be sanctioned, remains to be seen. With the lifting of the state of
emergency April 13, we will also eventually learn the affiliation, if any, of those who were killed
at the embassy. Precedents: The embassy's inadequate security system shows that US authorities
never expected such action from the Honduran people. The Honduran security chiefs present the
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same argument to excuse their two-hour delay in response to the riot. Asked to describe precedents
to the recent violent outburst, Hondurans can only come up with one in living memory. In 1969,
on hearing that Salvadoran troops had crossed the border, Hondurans rioted, looting and burning
Salvadoran-owned shops. School children broke their pencils and tore up their notebooks made
in El Salvador. Decades-old friendships snapped. And thousands of Salvadorans were herded
into the National Stadium pending deportation. These were effects of war. It is to Hondurans'
credit that the Reagan administration has not managed to reproduce these same effects vis-avis the supposed invasions by Nicaragua. Despite major differences, the recent actions do have
something in common with the events of 1969. Back then, people acted out their frustrations against
Salvadorans with a sense of unanimity. Similarly, everyone politically right, left and indifferent
condemned the Matta kidnapping. Unlike the situation of universal uncertainty surrounding last
month's US troop deployment, here was something definite and practically indefensible. It was a
chance for everyone to speak and act against the occupiers. One other precedent deserves special
mention. In the summer of 1987, the US Congress forced the Azcona government to compensate a
US citizen whose land was appropriated by the military. On paper, all military bases in the country
are Honduran. In practice, the one built on Temistocles Ramirez' land was strictly a US base: the
Regional Military Training Center (CREM) created primarily for Green Berets to train Salvadoran
counterinsurgency troops. At a gut level, Hondurans still widely see Salvadorans as their enemy.
A nationalist outcry forced the center to close within a year of its 1983 opening. The site's former
owner, Ramirez (not a Honduran national), petitioned the US Congress to pressure Honduras for
compensation since, technically, the CREM was a Honduran base. Congress withheld economic aid
to get its way. Also at that time, Honduran public opinion became unanimous against compensating
Ramirez (but the opposition was ultimately ignored). There were several issues. Some thought
the US should be responsible since the CREM was really a US base. A more fundamental issue
was that Ramirez owned the land illegally to begin with. Foreigners are prohibited from owning
coastal property. But the issue reaching deepest into Honduran social history was that the land had
been usurped from its rightful owner, a Garifuna (Honduran Black) community. The widespread
opposition to compensating Ramirez, however, responded to something much simpler: he was not
Honduran... In the case of Matta Ballesteros, cause for patriotic reaction is all the stronger, since he
is a Honduran being jerked around by the United States.

-- End --
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